Experimental Analysis on the Feasibility of Voice Based Symmetric Key Generation for   Embedded Devices by Kamineni, Surya Bharat
University of South Florida
Scholar Commons
Graduate Theses and Dissertations Graduate School
June 2017
Experimental Analysis on the Feasibility of Voice
Based Symmetric Key Generation for Embedded
Devices
Surya Bharat Kamineni
University of South Florida, suryabharat@mail.usf.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/etd
Part of the Computer Sciences Commons
This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate School at Scholar Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Graduate
Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of Scholar Commons. For more information, please contact scholarcommons@usf.edu.
Scholar Commons Citation
Kamineni, Surya Bharat, "Experimental Analysis on the Feasibility of Voice Based Symmetric Key Generation for Embedded Devices"
(2017). Graduate Theses and Dissertations.
http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/etd/6874
 
 
 
 
 
Experimental Analysis on the Feasibility of Voice Based Symmetric Key Generation for  
 
Embedded Devices 
 
 
 
by 
  
 
 
Surya Bharat Kamineni 
 
 
 
 
 
A thesis submitted in partial fulfilment  
of the requirements for the degree of 
Master of Science in Computer Science 
Department of Computer Science and Engineering 
College of Engineering 
University of South Florida 
 
 
 
Major Professor: Sriram Chellappan, Ph.D. 
Srinivas Katkoori, Ph.D. 
Ravi Sankar, Ph.D. 
 
 
Date of Approval: 
May 2, 2017 
 
 
 
Keywords: Key generation from voice, Mobile device security, Key sharing 
 
Copyright © 2017, Surya Bharat Kamineni 
   
 
 
 
 
 
DEDICATION 
 
I would like to dedicate this thesis to my loving family, along with my advisor and friends 
who have constantly been a great source of inspiration and support. I am forever indebted to my 
family and my advisor for their understanding and endless encouragement throughout the 
process.  
 
 
 
 
 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
 
Firstly, I would like to express my deepest gratitude to my advisor Dr. Sriram Chellappan 
for his never ending support and guidance throughout my research. Without his support and 
guidance this would not have been possible. I am very thankful to Dr. Srinivas Katkoori and            
Dr. Ravi Sankar for serving on my thesis defense committee and for their valuable inputs. I would 
like to thank George Loriya for helping me in the Bluetooth data sniffing project. I would like to 
thank the Computer Science and Engineering Department of University of South Florida for 
supporting me with the Teaching Assistant for the course of my study. Lastly, I would like to thank 
all my friends who supported me throughout this process. 
 
 
 i 
 
 
 
 
 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
LIST OF TABLES iii 
 
LIST OF FIGURES iv 
 
ABSTRACT v 
 
CHAPTER 1:  INTRODUCTION AND MOTIVATION 1 
1.1    Motivation for the Problem 1 
1.2    Proposed Approach 3 
1.3    Issues Faced in the Research 5 
1.4    A Note on Related Works on Voice Recognition for Security 6 
1.5    Organization of Thesis 7 
1.6    Chapter Summary 7 
 
CHAPTER 2:  OVERVIEW OF THE PROPOSED SCHEME 8 
2.1    Problem Statement 8 
2.2    Summary of the Proposed Protocol 8 
2.3    Bloom Filter 10 
2.3.1    Bloom Filter Mechanism 10 
2.3.2    Adding and Querying Elements into Bloom Filter 11 
2.4    Chapter Summary 11 
 
CHAPTER 3:  DATA COLLECTION 12 
3.1    Setting the Environment for Experiment 12 
3.2    Data Collection Process 13 
3.3    Chapter Summary 13 
 
CHAPTER 4:  PROPOSED PROTOCOL 14 
4.1    Core Requirements for Implementing the Protocol 14 
4.2    Attack Models 15 
4.2.1    Passive Attack 15 
4.2.2    Active Attack 15 
4.3    Proposed Protocol in Detail 15 
4.3.1    Algorithm for Preprocessing and Splitting the Data/ Code 17 
4.4    Bloom Filter Structure After Adding Data Values 22 
4.5    Chapter Summary 23
 ii 
 
CHAPTER 5:  IMPLEMENTATION OF PROTOCOL 24 
5.1    Bloom Filter Applications 24 
5.2    Implementation of Bloom Filter in Protocol 25 
5.3    Chapter Summary 28 
 
CHAPTER 6:  EVALUATION OF PROTOCOL 29 
6.1    Number of Bits Shared for Loud Sound 30 
6.2    Number of Bits Shared for Normal Sound 31 
6.3    Number of Bits Shared for Whisper 32 
6.4    Chapter Summary 34 
 
CHAPTER 7:  CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 35 
7.1    Conclusion 35 
7.2    Future Work 36 
 
REFERENCES 37 
 
APPENDIX A:  BLUETOOTH LOW ENERGY (BLE) SNIFFER, EAVESDROPPING THE DATA 38 
A.1    Abstract 38 
A.2    BLE Sniffer 38 
A.3    Software 39 
A.4    nRF – Sniffer 39 
A.5    Wireshark 40 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 iii 
 
 
 
 
 
 
LIST OF TABLES 
 
Table 6.1  No.of bits shared between the original devices and intruder for loud sound 30 
 
Table 6.2  No.of bits shared between the original devices and intruder for normal sound 31 
 
Table 6.3  No.of bits shared between the original devices and intruder for whisper 32 
 
  
 iv 
 
 
 
 
 
 
LIST OF FIGURES 
 
Figure 1.1  Process flow of the proposed protocol 4 
 
Figure 4.1  Comparison of FFT signal between the original and intruder at 5 feet 19 
 
Figure 4.2  Maximum frequency component and sound pressure of signal 21 
 
Figure 4.3  Structure of bloom filter after embedding the data values 22 
 
Figure 5.1  Graph to represent relation between the no.of entries in bloom filter Vs size 27 
 
Figure 5.2  Graph to represent no.of hash functions is constant 28 
 
Figure 6.1  Sound pressure signal of whisper sound 33 
 
Figure A1  BLE sniffer (nRF51822 – v1.0) 38 
 
Figure A2  Display of nRF sniffer 39 
 
Figure A3  Connecting to the device 40 
 
Figure A4  Wireshark readings of packets transfer 41 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 v 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
In this thesis, we present results of an experimental study in order to generate a secure 
cryptographic key from the user’s voice which is to be shared between two mobile devices. We 
identified two security threats related to this problem, discussed the challenges to design the key 
generation/ sharing mechanism, and proposed a new protocol based on bloom filters that 
overcomes the two main attacks by the intruder. One is when the attacker places its device in 
the close vicinity of the location where the user attempts to generate/ share the key in order to 
derive the key from eavesdropping on communication messages. The second is when the 
attacker visually observes the experiment being performed and it tries to replicate the same 
experiment to reproduce the key. We present several results that demonstrate the practicality 
of our proposed technique in the context of communications between smart-phone
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION AND MOTIVATION 
 
In recent times, there has been an extensive research on mobile devices security and key 
generation between mobile devices for secure transfer of data, but still there is ample scope of 
improvement and innovation required in these areas. Gartner, an American research and 
advisory firm’s research shows that by 2018 more than 50% of users will use tablet or smartphone 
first for all online activities. Google also states that searches on mobile devices already surpassed 
PCs in US. The wearable market is exploding today with numerous applications in healthcare. 
Needless to say, secure and privacy for mobile devices is an important problem. In this thesis, we 
focus on the broad problem of enabling two mobile devices securely communicate with each 
other without the need for an external infrastructure like the Internet. 
1.1 Motivation for the Problem  
As we know, passwords and biometrics etc. are used for securing a mobile device, but 
they are not used for key generation. To make communications between devices secure, we need 
secret keys between the communicating parties. There are schemes proposed where public key 
crypto can be used, wherein the public key is open, but the private key is secret. However, these 
are complex in terms of overhead, and also, in the domain of mobile devices like smart-phones 
which are shared by users, even private keys can be exposed.   
In fact, as evidence of the significance of this work, we present in the Appendix some 
discussions on an implementation we have conducted wherein a Bluetooth sniffer was used to 
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sniff the communication between a Fitbit wearable device and a smartphone. While details are 
presented in the Appendix, we clarify here that such an attack is entirely feasible with 
appropriate engineering techniques designed to sniff wireless communications, and existing 
static key based schemes are not effective to mitigate such attacks (especially for mobile devices 
which are shared at times)  
As a result, the motivation of this thesis is to enable run time generation of keys that are 
shared between two devices just prior to the start of a communication. Core requirements are 
the following 
a. Before the start of a secure communication, our technique should ensure that both 
devices share the same key with a high probability without sending the key in plaintext. 
b. The generation of keys must be user initiated. 
c. At each round of communication, the key generation must be unique from prior keys. 
d. The protocol must be robust enough to prevent practical attackers from exposing the 
key under two attacks. The first attack model is a) one where the adversary is in the 
vicinity of the on-going communication initiated by the user and the attacker tries to 
eavesdrop on the communication to decipher they key. We call this attack as a passive 
attack. The second attack model is more of an active attack where the attacker tries to 
replicate whatever action the user initiates to setup the key in order to recreate the key. 
We will also demonstrate the experiment of sniffing  by using a Bluetooth Low Energy 
sensor when the data is being transferred from a wearable device to phone. 
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1.2 Proposed Approach 
 Our proposed approach is explained in Figure 1.1. The user places both communicating 
devices in close proximity, and generates an audio signal through his/her vocal cords. 
Subsequently, each of the two devices converts the resulting time domain sound pressure signal 
to absolute FFT where it will have all the frequency components of the signal embedded into it. 
We parse the absolute FFT of the signal for the values which will be shared between the two 
mobile devices. We use these amplitude values to generate the shared secret key, which we 
explain subsequently.  At this point, each of the two devices will have generated the values which 
are to be shared across the other mobile device to generate a key.  Now it will be the case that 
(more) number of amplitude values in the signal will be the same for both devices, but some of 
them will be different. Also, we do not want to let these amplitude values be transmitted in plain 
text. If the data is transferred in plain text, it gives the intruder a high chance to decipher the 
data when he obtained from eavesdropping. To still enable key sharing with a high probability, 
the devices will embed their parsed values in a Bloom Filter independently and share with the 
other device. Each device will then verify if their derived values from their sound pressure signal 
are in the other device’s Bloom filter. With the right choice of parameters in the bloom filter, we 
can ensure that false positives are very low. Subsequently, the matched entries are integrated to 
form the shared key. The proposed protocol overcome the two main practical attacks by the 
intruder. The entire protocol is presented in detail subsequent sections.  
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Figure 1.1  Process flow of the proposed protocol 
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1.3 Issues Faced in the Research 
 To the best of our knowledge, this problem is unique and the proposed solution is also 
unique. Since the work is pioneering, there are a number of challenges to deal with. We identify 
them below. 
a. The impact of vowels and consonants: The sounds produced by vowels, consonants, 
words etc. are all different. For an instance we observed maximum sound pressure was 
for vowel sounds, while the signal oscillated low levels for consonant sounds. Vowel 
sounds are produced with on open vocal tract, so that the tongue doesn’t touch lips, teeth 
or the roof of the mouth. There is no build-up of air pressure above the glottis. This 
enables high peaks in the sound produced. This is in contrast to the consonants sound 
produced, where there is closure at some point along the vocal tract and the tongue is 
touching teeth, lips or roof of the mouth unlike vowels. For whole words, we observed 
the peaks at the times where vowels are spoken. The time and frequency at which each 
of the sound produced is also quite unique. In these experiments we took into 
consideration of the sounds produced by the vowels, consonants, and whole words to see 
how each of these impacted key sharing.  
b. The impact of uttering words instead of characters: On an average words with Vowels in 
between them share more number of bits compared to only vowel sounds, but the 
intruder is able to eavesdrop 8% of the shared data during the word uttering process 
compared to that of only vowels, which is only 2% - 3%. Also in consonant sounds the 
intruder is able to get more than 15% of the shared data of the original experiment. So,  
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from the experiments we observed that the security is better in single vowels followed by 
whole words and consonants. 
c. The impact of the decibel level of the uttered sound (loud vs. normal vs. whisper): We 
performed the experiments in three levels of the sound and measured the decibel level 
for them. We observed that the loud sound is produced at the average of 72 dB, normal 
sound is produced at an average of 61 dB and whisper is produced at an average of 44 dB. 
We observed that on an average whisper sound shared more number of bits compared 
to the all the levels of sound, but intruder can eavesdrop more than 20% of shared data 
compared to the normal sound where only 2%-3% of the shared data is exposed to the 
intruder.    
1.4 A Note on Related Works on Voice Recognition for Security 
The usage of voice as a biometric for cyber security is quite old. The basic idea to match 
a voice at runtime with known samples of the user’s voice derived during training. Applications 
of this lie in many domains including smart-phones where user’s voice are being used for 
authenticating a user. There are software like Agnitio Voice ID, in the market where it can be 
installed on the mobile device for authenticating the user. There are two downfalls to be 
addressed here, one is the user need to train the program with set of phrases and the software 
will only work for those predefined phrases. The second issue is if the mobile by mistakenly 
shared with the intruder when the device is unlocked and had the trained data locally, the 
intruder can get access to data (audio file) associated with them. Now, as the intruder is having 
the audio files he might reproduce the signal and imitate like the original user.   
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While most of the present day voice authentication software use complex algorithms like 
Mel Frequency Cepstral Coefficient (MFCC), Dynamic Time Wrapping (DTW) etc. which require 
lot of computation power and its complexity to implement on mobile device. The above 
mentioned software does not provide authentication independently. Which means the data 
needs to be sent to the server over the internet and the speech data is processed over there and 
sent back to the mobile. Here another range of security issues rises about the communication 
channels of internet. Also, these techniques only enable authentication and do not discuss the 
problem of sharing keys between two devices, which is explained in our experiments. Each time 
when the user speaks there will be a new unique key generated in the real time. This scheme 
over comes the problem of public and private key concept where it will exposed if the mobile is 
shared with the intruder.  The solutions proposed by us in this thesis are not attempted before. 
1.5 Organization of Thesis 
Chapter 2 provides the over view of the proposed scheme using voice. Chapter 3 explains 
the experimental setup and Data collection. Chapter 4 presents about the proposed protocol and 
how we can overcome the two important types of attacks by the intruder. Chapter 5 consists of 
evaluation of the algorithm and results for different set of vowels and words. Chapter 6 provides 
the future work and concludes the thesis. 
1.6 Chapter Summary 
 In this chapter, we explained importance of security in mobile devices and our motivation 
in using voice for key generation compared to other bio metrics. We also discussed about the 
challenges faced in using voice and advantages of our protocol compared to voice authentication 
software.  
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CHAPTER 2: OVERVIEW OF THE PROPOSED SCHEME 
 
In order for the voice enabled key management technique to perform effectively, the 
algorithm must be able to generate unique set of keys for each and every of iteration. Human 
voice produce a series of harmonic sounds, frequencies etc. each of this sound is attributed 
uniquely to each person and is different each time they speak. Even though the intruder is able 
to capture the phrase what we are using for key generation, the intruder cannot replicate the 
exact signal because the harmonics of the sound, the maximum frequency component, the sound 
pressure and the exact length of the signal are different each time anyone speaks.  
2.1 Problem Statement  
The main goal of the project is to build an algorithm to generate keys in runtime which 
are shared between two devices just prior to start of communication. The algorithms must be 
independent of internet and which can be implemented efficiently on a smart phone. 
2.2 Summary of the Proposed Protocol 
The user places two mobile devices in the close proximity and at equal distance from the 
origin of sound. Then the user generates an audio signal through their vocal cords which will be 
recorded on both the mobile devices. Each of the two mobile devices independently process this 
data to generate the set of values which are to be shared between them. 
According to the Nyquist-Shannon theorem we need to maintain double the sampling 
rate for the frequency we want to measure without losing any information. The normal frequency 
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of human voice ranges between 500 Hz to 2 kHz. So, it’s clearly sufficient for us to maintain 4410 
samples per second as the sampling rate. So, each mobile after collecting the data, performs 
down sampling on it. Once the data is down sampled, absolute FFT is performed on the signal to 
change it into frequency domain and change the complex FFT signal to absolute signal. We 
rounded the signal to two places after the decimal to demonstrate feasibility. 
 Why cannot we use the direct sound pressure, why did we do the FFT? 
The most important reason we performed FFT on the time domain of the signal is 
because, the speech signal have changing frequency characteristics. Such characteristics cannot 
be captured effectively by making use of time domain alone. More over in the original sound 
pressure signal the values are very less i.e. 0.00074 dB except the places where there are peaks, 
which does not support our proposed algorithm model.  More importantly as we are dealing with 
the voice signals frequency domain plays a major role. In the frequency domain the signal is 
mirror imaged, so we considered only first half of the signal for the algorithm to process. 
We parse 250 values around the maximum value in the frequency domain signal. So, there 
will be a total of 501 values in each mobile including maximum value. We use these frequency 
values to generate the shared secret key.  
 Why did we consider 250 values around maximum? Why not it can be 300 or any other 
number?  
When we take complete signal, most part of the signal is oscillating at very low values, 
there will be many random matches which is not desired. We want to match where there is 
similar pattern of the wave in the both signals. From our 40 experiments, we observed that the 
very similar pattern of the signal is observed mostly in the areas where there is a peak in the 
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signal and that too 250 values around the signal on an average is calculated from the 40 
experiments. Now each of the mobile device embed their parsed 501 values into the bloom filter 
and shared with the other mobile. There are some extra features added to enhance the security 
features which are discussed in the subsequent sessions. 
 Why Bloom filter? Why can’t we send all the 501 values directly? 
Yes, we can send the data in plain text without using a bloom filter, but there is lack of 
security. If the intruder captures while we are sending the information, he can spoof like original 
mobile as he will have all 501 values. To overcome this problem we need to send the data via 
bloom filter. Even though the intruder captures bloom filter it’s very hard for him to decode the 
original values which are inserted into it, because bloom filter has only 0’s and 1’s to represent a 
number and entries are hashed using one-way has functions. 
2.3 Bloom Filter 
2.3.1 Bloom Filter Mechanism 
Bloom filter is a space-efficient probabilistic data structure, introduced by Howard Bloom 
in 1970. This is used to test if the element is a member of the set. False positive matches are 
possible. But, false negative matches are not. The false positive nature can be reduced by 
increasing the size of the bloom filter and introduce highly random hash functions to insert the 
elements into bloom filter. 
The empty bloom filter is a bit array of m bits, which is all set to zero. There are h different 
hash functions defined, where each of the hash function maps to one of m bit position with a 
uniform random distribution. The number of hash functions h is a constant and is much smaller 
than size of bloom filter m. h and m are determined by the intended false positive rate of filter. 
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2.3.2 Adding and Querying Element into Bloom Filter 
The adding of element into the bloom filter follows the process of feeding it to each of h 
hash function to get h array positions and set the bits of all these positions to 1. 
To check if the element is present in the bloom filter, feed it to all the h hash functions 
and get h array positions. Check these array positions, if any of the bits at these positions is 0, 
the element is definitely not in the set. This is because, if it was there in the set, previously when 
the element is inserted it would have changed to 1.  
Removing an element from the bloom filter is impossible because false negatives are not 
permitted. An elements maps to k bits in the array, for removing the element it’s sufficient to 
make any one of the bits to zero. But this also results in removing any other elements that happen 
to map onto that bit. It’s impossible to determine whether any other elements have been 
associated with that bit. So, clearing of bit and removing elements from bloom filter results in 
false negatives, which is why removing elements is prohibited. 
2.4 Chapter Summary 
In this chapter, we examined the related work already done in key generation from voice 
using complex algorithms like MFCC, Voice Biometrics etc. We also explained the problem 
statement of this experiment and summary of the protocol discussed in the further sections. We 
have examined the mechanism of bloom filter, how elements are added into it, querying the 
bloom filter for the element if it’s present etc. 
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CHAPTER 3: DATA COLLECTION 
 
The sensitivity of the microphone will be vary across different mobiles. So, if we use 
different mobiles for recording the sound generated the data collected will not be coherent. To 
make the data collected consistent across all the experiments. We performed this experiment 
using exact similar Samsung S5 phones to record the sound data.  
3.1 Setting the Environment for Experiment 
While conducting the experiment we have placed all the mobiles on a plane surface and 
at equal heights. The two phones on where the original experiment is being conducted is placed 
next to each other (i.e. 0.5 cm away from each other) and we generated the sound through vocal 
cords in the middle of two phones and 1.5 feet away from them. So that the origin of speech and 
distance of the two microphones is almost equal.  The intruder phones are placed at 5 and 10 
feet from the original experiment to eavesdrop the data when performing the experiment. The 
intruder phones are placed at exact same orientation of the original phones.  
The experiment is conducted in a quiet room with the Sound Pressure level is at 42 dB, 
we recorded the sound generated by using the voice recorder application which is available in 
any smart phone 
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3.2 Data Collection Process 
We generated vowel sounds like (A, E, I, O, U), consonants (B, F, J, M, S), little complex 
(CAT, MET, PIN) and more complex words like HELLO, DATA, SECRET, COMPLICATED etc. The 
vowel sounds are not the normal alphabetical sounds, but the Actual phonetic sounds of vowels 
Each experiment is iterated 10 times for collecting the average consistency. We collected 
data for loud voice with average sound pressure of 72 dB, normal conversation voice with 
average of 61 dB sound pressure and whisper sound with average sound pressure of 44 dB 
Before we perform every iteration we first start all the voice recorders and then the sound 
is generated near the original phones where the intruder phones are at 5 and 10 feet away. We 
recorded all the utterances of the data for 1 male and 1 female voices and took the average of 
both to normalize the number of bits shared.  There are 18 unique words/ Vowel sounds uttered 
total of 10 iteration for each utterance and 3 levels of sound for each sound generated. After 
performing all the experiments we segregated the files manually and performed analysis on it 
which is described in detail in the following sections. 
3.3 Chapter Summary 
 In this chapter, we discussed about the experimental set up and data collection process. 
In first part of the chapter we discussed about environment set up for the experiment and in the 
second part we explained how the data collection is performed and what measures are taken 
into consideration while performing the experiment. 
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CHAPTER 4: PROPOSED PROTOCOL 
 
In this section we present our protocol, explain the process of key generation between 
the two mobile devices and describe how the proposed technique overcomes the passive and 
active attack models in detail. 
4.1 Core Requirements for Implementing the Protocol   
For convenience, we recall the core requirements for implementing our protocol are as 
follows 
a. Before the start of a secure communication, our technique should ensure that both 
devices share the same key with a high probability without sending the key in plaintext. 
b. The generation of keys must be user initiated. 
c. At each round of communication, the key generation must be unique from prior keys. 
d. The protocol must be robust enough to prevent practical attackers from exposing the key 
under two attacks. The first attack model is a) one where the adversary is in the vicinity 
of the on-going communication initiated by the user and the attacker tries to eavesdrop 
on the communication to decipher they key. We call this attack as a passive attack. The 
second attack model is more of an active attack where the attacker tries to replicate 
whatever action the user initiates to setup the key in order to recreate the key.  
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4.2 Attack Models   
4.2.1 Passive Attack 
In this attack model the adversary places the mobile device in the vicinity of the ongoing 
communication initiated by the user and uses a mobile phone to eavesdrop on the sound 
generated by the vocal cords to decipher the key. Here for our experiments we considered the 
adversary places his mobile device at 5 and 10 feet to eavesdrop on communication. We call this 
type of attack as passive attack model. 
4.2.2 Active Attack 
In this model the attacker observes when the experiment is being conducted and tries to 
replicate the same type of sound which the user initiated for setting up the key in order to 
recreate the key. With this generated key the attacker tries to decrypt the messages exchanged 
by the original mobiles. We consider this type of attack as active attack model. 
4.3 Proposed Protocol in Detail 
 The two mobile devices used for communication are placed on a plane surface and in the 
close proximity. The user generates the sound through their vocal cords, which will be recorded 
by the mobile device’s microphone. The sound is generated in the middle of both the phones to 
maintain equal distance between the point of origin of sound and microphone. We have taken 
enough care to maintain 1.5 feet distance between the microphone and the point of generation 
of sound all the time for consistency.  
 Once the sound is recorded by both the mobiles, each of the mobile phones process the 
data independently to generate the set of values which will be shared between them for key 
generation. As discussed in the previous sections, according to the Nyquist-Shannon theorem we 
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need to maintain at least double the sampling rate compared to the frequency we want to 
measure. The normal frequency of human voice ranges from 500 Hz to 2 KHz. The data collected 
through the mobile communication device is at the sampling rate of 44100 samples/sec. To make 
the data able to process easily on a smart phone we have down sampled it to 4410 samples/sec. 
This makes the protocol to reduce the overhead of dealing with large data without losing any 
information. 
 The data which is originally collected is in time domain and is called as sound pressure. 
Sound pressure is defined as the instantaneous pressure at a point in the presence of sound wave 
and the static pressure of the medium. After having the down sampled data, both the mobile 
devices independently process the resulting time domain sound pressure signal to FFT where it 
will have all the frequency components of the signal embed in it. We performed FFT on the 
original signal because, as speech signal have changing frequency characteristics, which cannot 
capture all the useful data effectively using time domain alone. We also observed values in the 
original signal are very less (i.e. 0.00043 dB) except the places where there are high sound 
pressure peaks. Our protocol is designed in such a way that it focuses on similarities and features 
in both the signals of the original mobile devices to generate the key. So, if most values are in the 
lower range then it will contradict with the protocol model.  
The original FFT signal with complex number value increases the bit transfer rate, and 
from our experiments we observed that very less number of values exactly match with the 
complex numbers generated in other mobile which is not desired for key generation process. So, 
we transformed the Fast Fourier transform of the signal to the absolute FFT, where it will have 
values in the form of real numbers. So, once we get the absolute signal we are applying rounding 
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to two digits after decimal to the each value in the data. The rounding is done to make the 
protocol detect the values generated in other mobile and to reduce the overhead of 
communicating with large numbers. For an instance an absolute FFT value of 4.007291 will be 
rounded off to 4.01.  The absolute FFT of the signal will be having the mirror image which is 
redundant for our protocol for key calculation purpose. So, we are dividing the signal into two 
equal parts and consider the first part for our process of key generation. From here when we 
refer the FFT signal we mean the signal which is obtained after the going through the process of 
removing the redundancy.  
4.3.1 Algorithm for Preprocessing and Splitting the Data/ Code 
 
The algorithm below explains the process of transforming the time domain sound 
pressure signal to frequency domain where it will have all the frequency components embed into 
it. It also explains the process of how the data is parsed from the FFT signal for sharing with other 
mobile during the key generation process.   
 Down sample the signal by using decimate function 
rs = decimate(signal, 10) 
 Convert the resultant signal (rs) to absolute FFT  
rs1 = abs(fft(rs)) 
 Remove the redundant signal (mirror image) from rs1 by considering only first half 
middle = ceil (numel(rs1)/2); 
final_signal = rs1(1:middle) 
 Round the values in the FFT to two places after the decimal point in final_signal 
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 Search for the location at which maximum value occurred in the final_signal and call it 
as maximum_location 
 If maximum_location is greater than 251th location parse the 250 values around the 
maximum. i.e. total of 501 values including the maximum value 
 Else  
consider the location of the maximum value as maximum_location 
parse the values from start of the signal to the maximum_location value 
and also 250 values above from maximum_location. 
END  
We observed from our experiments that the signal generated for every iteration in two 
original phones is very much similar around the peak areas. Figure 4.2 shows how both of the 
signals in the original communication device follow similar pattern around the peaks and intruder 
has a complete different pattern which is 5 feet away from the experiment. 
We made our protocol to parse the values around the maximum values which will cover 
the similar pattern followed in both the mobiles. From the previous experiments we were able 
to come up with 250 values around the maximum value will giving the optimum results for our 
protocol. If we consider the complete signal we will take many redundant values which may not 
help our protocol to create a secured secret key. 
 In the following sections we will discuss the results obtained for different kinds of sounds 
produced by human voice and the length of key shared for each type of sound generated from 
human voice.  
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We considered Vowel, consonants and simple words to perform the key generation for 
our experiments. We also observed that if we use more complex words there are many peaks 
formed where there are vowel sounds. 
 
Figure 4.1  Comparison of FFT signal between the original and intruder at 5 feet 
Once the FFT signal is obtained, the algorithms searches for the maximum value in the set 
of values its containing. After identifying the maximum value, it then parses 250 values around 
the maximum value (both sides). So, there will be a total of 501 values including the maximum 
parsed in each of the mobile device.  
 Now each mobile device independently embed their parsed 501 values (may be less 
sometimes when the maximum location is not greater than 251) into the bloom filter and send 
across to another original mobile device on which the experiment is being conducted. If we send 
this data in the plain text the intruder can eavesdrop the data and impersonate as the original 
mobile, which must be avoided. 
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In each of the original mobile devices once the bloom filter is received from other original 
mobile device, they check the generated data by querying the elements from bloom filter. For 
our protocol to function effectively we need to maintain the false positive rate at near to 0%, 
because the key should be exactly same in both the mobile devices. With the right choice of 
parameters in the bloom filter, we can ensure the false positive rate at very low.  Once each of 
the mobile device queries its derived data it has with the bloom filter obtained from other mobile 
device, the matched entries are integrated to form the shared key. The shared secret which has 
been obtained will be exactly same in both the mobile devices. The number of bits shared for 
different range of sounds by the original mobiles and intruder is discussed in subsequent 
sections. 
During the case of using normal human voice (Avg 62 dB level) for generating a key by 
using our algorithm, the intruder at 5 feet was able to capture only 3% to 5% on an average of 
the data which is generated as the key.  
Here the algorithm for preprocessing and the protocol is publicly available and intruder 
can follow exact same process as we are following. But here the intruder will have a data 
generated 5 or 10 feet away from the microphone. So, most of the values are really very less 
compared to the original values. So, there are very less matches with the original signal. If we 
considered the complete signal instead of parsing, the intruder was able to eavesdrop more than 
30% which is not desired. So, we choose to parse the signal for the relevant 501 values. 
Even though the intruder captures any of the bloom filter of original mobile devices while 
they are communicating, the intruder will not be able to recreate the secret key which is shared 
by the two original phones because with the values intruder has he can maximum create 5 % of 
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the original key which is useless in case of shared secret key mechanism. So, sending data by 
embedding the values in the bloom filter solves our passive attack model when the intruder tries 
to eavesdrop on communication between the original mobile devices from a distance of 5 and 
10 feet.  
If the intruder observes the experiment is being conducted and tries to replicate the same 
type of sound which the user generated for setting up the key and impersonates as the original 
user by sending the bloom filter by embedding the values to any of the two original mobiles. Here 
the intruder cannot recreate the exact key which the original mobiles are sharing, but the 
intruder can recreate some percent of the values which the original mobile devices are sharing. 
But we know that if the intruder want to get access the data he need to know the exact key, not 
even 99.99 % will work to decrypt the data. 
 
Figure 4.2  Maximum frequency component and sound pressure of signal 
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4.4 Bloom Filter Structure After Adding Data Values 
 
Figure 4.3  Structure of bloom filter after embedding the data values 
The above figure represents how the data values, sound pressure level and maximum 
frequency component values are added into the bloom filter in each of the mobile device 
independently on which original experiment is being conducted. Once both the mobile device 
embed these values into their respective bloom filter, the original mobiles will send the 930 bytes 
bloom filter to each other. The number of hash functions are fixed to 10 because we need to 
maintain the false positive rate of 0.1% to make our protocol function effectively. The 
calculations that made to come up with the size of the bloom filter, number of hash functions 
used and the range of feature values inserted into the bloom filter are described in detail in the 
subsequent chapters. 
After receiving the bloom filter from any mobile device even from the intruder, both the 
original mobiles queries its derived sound pressure value and maximum frequency component 
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value with bloom filter. If any one or both features are not present in the bloom filter then there 
is a high chance that the bloom filter is sent by the attacker and then algorithm simply rejects 
searching any further saving its resources. By using this technique the algorithm is overcoming 
the denial of service attack in the very starting itself. If and only if the two features are matching 
with the values present in the bloom filter it then proceed to check the values to generate the 
key. The sound pressure and maximum frequency component in the FFT cannot be replicated by 
the intruder because the intensity and frequency component of the sound varies for every 
iteration.   
 There is a very slim chance that the situation of considering the original mobile as an 
intruder and denying the access may happen. In this case we need to perform the experiment 
once again and generate the key. 
4.5 Chapter Summary 
In this chapter, we explained the state-of-art security protocol and how the proposed 
protocol overcomes the passive and active attacks by the intruder. The challenges faced and how 
we overcome them during the implementation. We discussed about the features derived from 
the vocal cords generated voice and how we can use these features in our technique. 
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CHAPTER 5: IMPLEMENTATION OF PROTOCOL 
  
In this chapter we will discuss the applications of bloom filter and its implementation in 
our protocol. 
5.1 Bloom Filter Applications 
In this section we will discuss some of the common applications of bloom filters in the 
technologies we use every day. Bloom filter is extensively used in application where false 
positives is ok, but false negative cannot be. 
When we send email to people, the browser side java script quickly checks the Bloom 
filter in the browser cache for the respective email addressed. 
 What’s the advantage of using bloom filter in the above example? 
It avoids the round trip to back end servers to verify whether or not these email addresses 
are already in our contact list. As we already know, bloom filters are excellent at telling you what 
is not in a set. In this case this will tell us with email addresses that are not in our contact list. 
Bloom filters may sometimes encounter false positives- usually the false positive rate can 
be lowered if the length and number of hash functions are optimally chosen depending on 
number of elements going into the bloom filter. The goal of bloom filter is to make cheap and 
high probability guesses. In case of few false positives, you will need to detect those missing 
entries yourself. 
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 One other common application is probably testing to see if an element exists on disk 
before performing any input or output operation. We risk sometimes looking for something 
that’s not there, but you will never skip testing a segment because bloom filter said it wasn’t 
there and it was. This mechanism should reduce the I/O lookups dramatically over the large data 
sets. 
Bloom filter is also used in plugins to keep track of the pages that given user has visited 
without actually being able to enumerate the links they have visited. This helps the plugin 
developers to address the concerns that people may have about having their plugin on their 
system. The Bloom filter only enables us to test if a URL has been visited but not enumerate the 
URL they visited.  
5.2 Implementation of Bloom Filter in Protocol 
There is a predefined formula for selecting the size of the bloom filter and number of hash 
functions to be used for optimal results with low false positive.   
where, 
N: No. of items we expect to have in our Bloom filter 
 P: False positive rate acceptable (0 to 1) 
 M: No. of bits needed for implementing the bloom filter 
K: No. of Hash functions used 
The formula for calculating the no. of bits (M)  
M = - [N * ln (P)] / (ln (2) ^2)  
The formula for calculating the no. of Hash functions 
 K = M/N * ln (2) 
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We have discussed in the earlier chapters that we need to insert 501 entries derived from 
the vocal cords generated signal, max frequency component of the signal and sound pressure 
level into the bloom filter. 
From previous chapters we understand that the shared secret should be exact same set 
of values which are shared between the two original mobiles. So, we need to make sure the false 
positive rate is kept tending to zero.  
After doing the math for calculating the length of the bloom filter and no. of hash 
functions used to implement our protocol. We know that no. of derived values from sound to be 
inserted into the bloom filter is 501 and let’s assume we want the false positive rate be 0.1%. To 
achieve this false positive rate we need to use 10 hash functions.  
This makes N = 501, P = 0.001 and K = 10 
M = -501 * ln (0.001) / (ln (2) ^2) 
M = 7204 bits 
In the bloom filter apart from the derived sound pressure level values, we also need to 
insert the range of sound pressure level and maximum frequency component. All the values here 
are round off to whole numbers. The average error rate of sound pressure is less than 4% and 
the range is in between 40 dB to 80 dB in our experiments, so we need to insert 7 values around 
the sound pressure value derived.  i.e. if the derived sound pressure is 60 dB, we need to insert 
57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63 values into the bloom filter.  The error difference in between the 
maximum frequency components of the original mobile is less than 0.3 % and the usual range is 
between 400 Hz to 2000 Hz. So, by considering the error rate we need to insert 4 values around 
the maximum frequency component occurred place, total of 9 values including the maximum 
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frequency value. i.e. if the max frequency component is 1034 Hz, we need to insert values from 
1029 to 1038 into the bloom filter. The above error rates are calculated by taking average of all 
the experiments conducted. So, the total number of values that are being inserted into the bloom 
filter are sum of 501 derived values, 7 values of sound pressure level and 9 values of the maximum 
frequency component which is 517 values.  
So, the total number of bits the bloom filter should have to get the optimal results for the 
shared key distribution protocol is 7434 bits, which is equal to 930 bytes. 
 
Figure 5.1 Graph to represent relation between the no.of entries in bloom filter Vs size 
The above figure represents the trend of size of the bloom filter for No. of entries into it. 
We can observe that the trend line is growing exponentially as the no. of entries into the bloom 
filter increase. To form this above graph we took the false positive rate at 0.1 % and no. of hash 
functions used to insert entries into the bloom filter are 10. The values for number of bits in the 
bloom filter is calculated by using the formula specified above. 
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Figure 5.2 Graph to represent no.of hash functions is constant  
 We can observe from the above figure that, no. of hash functions is constant for any no. 
of entries. This is because to expect a 0.1% of false positive rate we need 9.96 hash functions 
(calculated by using the formula above). So, in total we need 10 hash functions and the size of 
the bloom filter to be 7434 bits which equal to 930 bytes to implement the protocol with a false 
positive rate of 0.1 %. 
5.3 Chapter Summary 
 In this section we discussed the real-time applications of bloom filter, formula used to 
calculate the size of the bloom filter and how it is implemented in our proposed protocol. 
 
 
 
 
 29 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 6: EVALUATION OF PROTOCOL 
 
In this chapter, we present the results obtained and insights gained form the experiments. 
We also present a detailed analysis on different types of sounds created by vocal cords and their 
impact on the key generation process. 
We performed the experiments with three different levels of sounds. The first type of 
sound is a very loud sound with the average sound pressure level of 72 dB. The second sound can 
be compared to the level of sound produced conversation between two persons. This has an 
average sound pressure level of 61 dB.  The third level of sound is whisper with the sound level 
of 44 dB.  
We have performed the experiments using vowel sounds (A, E, I, O, U), consonants (B, F, 
J, M, S) and  little complex words with one vowel in between them like CAT, MET, PIN The 
selection of consonant sounds is done in such a way that they are evenly distributed across all 
the alphabets. When we have generated complex words or phrases with multiple vowels in 
between them, we observed that the peaks are inconsistent in the original mobile devices. So, 
we consider only vowel sounds and complex words with single vowel between them work 
effectively as they have the very similar pattern in the signal around the peaks. 
The sound pressure of the environment in which we are conducting the experiment is 
around 42 dB on an average. All the reading of sound pressure are measured by the sound meter 
application available in the smart mobile. Each of the type sound produced by vocal cords is 
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iterated 10 times to check for the consistencies in the data and consider the average to normalize 
the data. Because, we have observed that our technique is generating unique keys and features 
for every iteration which is strongly desirable in providing real time security.   
To understand the quantity of data transferred and key shared we convert the list of key 
values in each of the mobile device into number of bits and aggregated them. Below are the data 
which describes number of bits shared by level of sound (loud, normal, whisper) and for the each 
type of sound (Vowels, consonants etc.) generated by the vocal cords. 
6.1 Number of Bits Shared for Loud Sound  
Table 6.1: No.of bits shared between the original devices and intruder for loud sound 
Sound Generated by 
vocal cords 
Bits shared b/w 
original phones 
Bits shared b/w 
intruder at 5 feet and 
intersection of 
original phones 
Bits shared b/w 
intruder at 10 feet 
and intersection of 
original phones 
Sound Pressure 
values (dB-units ) 
A 642 47 42 69 
E 784 76 19 73 
I 947 102 24 64 
O 642 28 0 75 
U 497 84 78 67 
     
B 824 216 106 77 
F 725 183 114 76 
J 1005 309 217 78 
M 740 274 98 73 
S 798 266 172 69 
     
CAT 937 122 33 68 
MET 866 0 15 63 
PIN 723 45 4 72 
POT 651 82 48 70 
HUB 924 113 107 66 
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The above values for number of bits shared are derived from the loud sound generated 
by the vocal cord. We can observe that even though consonant sounds were able to share similar 
number of bit compared to the vowel sounds and complex words, the intruder at 5 feet was 
sharing more than 25% of the exact keys in all the cases that are shared by the original mobile 
devices on which key generation process is initiated by the user. Intruder at 10 feet was able to 
share on an average 20% of the secret key shared by the original mobile devices. 
6.2 Number of Bits Shared for Normal Sound 
Table 6.2: No.of bits shared between the original devices and intruder for normal sound 
Sound Generated by 
vocal cords 
Bits shared b/w 
original phones 
Bits shared b/w 
intruder at 5 feet and 
intersection of 
original phones 
Bits shared b/w 
intruder at 10 feet 
and intersection of 
original phones 
Sound Pressure 
values (dB-units ) 
A 709 18 6 65 
E 786 74 0 61 
I 729 62 3 64 
O 768 38 27 66 
U 697 58 24 64 
     
B 712 147 92 61 
F 834 121 103 56 
J 907 176 119 58 
M 863 132 97 63 
S 913 181 127 52 
     
CAT 794 27 18 64 
MET 972 0 0 66 
PIN 604 14 2 62 
POT 1018 34 63 65 
HUB 986 37 51 61 
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The above values are derived from the sounds generated from the normal sound level 
with the average sound pressure level of 61 dB. These values follow the same trend as the 
previous loud sounds. We observe on an average they share similar number of bits. We can also 
observe that the intruder at 5 and 10 feet was able to share more than 22 % and 18% for sounds 
of consonants. On the other hand the intruder at 5 feet was able to share a very small portion 
i.e. less than 4% of the data on an average for the only vowel and complex words sound.  
6.3 Number of Bits Shared for Whisper 
Table 6.3: No.of bits shared between the original devices and intruder for whisper 
Sounds produced Bits shared b/w 
original phones 
Bits shared b/w 
intruder at 5 feet and 
intersection of 
original phones 
Bits shared b/w 
intruder at 10 feet 
and intersection of 
original phones 
Sound Pressure 
values (dB-units ) 
A 1706 105 131 48 
E 1241 129 195 41 
I 1057 117 168 47 
O 1411 48 103 39 
U 1512 99 141 41 
     
B 609 83 294 43 
F 1003 13 33 42 
J 681 135 225 36 
M 967 102 183 37 
S 642 126 198 35 
     
CAT 1156 119 27 37 
MET 570 174 264 36 
PIN 794 99 171 40 
POT 1394 57 129 38 
HUB 1064 135 285 39 
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The above values are derived from the sounds generated by whisper, with the average 
sound pressure level of 44 dB. As we can see whisper sound for all the types of sound shares 
relatively more number of secret key values compared to the normal and loud sounds. One 
reason we observed for this kind of occurrence is the low level of signal. As most of the signal 
values are very low and if there is a slight noise created while stopping the recorder or by the 
user itself, this result in the algorithm picking up that value as the maximum and parse the data. 
Example for such instance is shown below in the figure 6.1. Here in the graph below Y axis is the 
sound pressure and X axis is time. As we know whisper have very less sound pressure level, the 
values in the graph are also low. We can observe in phone 2 there is a little noise while stopping 
the audio signal, then we have observed a peak in the signal. This makes our algorithm to consider 
second peak while parsing data for embedding into bloom filter, which is not desirable. So, to 
avoid these type of complication we recommend to use only vowel sounds or complex words 
with one vowel sound to generate a secured secret key by using our technique.   
 
Figure 6.1 Sound pressure signal of whisper sound  
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6.4 Chapter Summary 
 In this chapter we have observed the results obtained for different levels and types of 
sounds generated by the human voice. We observed that even though whisper sound share more 
number of bits for the original mobile devices, the intruder during whisper sound is also sharing 
significant amount of the data. From our experiments we observed that normal level of sounds 
and vowels and simple words produced better results for our proposed protocol. 
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CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
 
7.1 Conclusion 
 In this thesis, we demonstrated the feasibility of generating a shared secret key from 
sound generated by the vocal cords. We mainly focused on making our technique generate 
unique key for every iteration and making it process the data independently over a smart phone, 
which is lacking in commercial voice authentication software available. Most of the voice 
authentication software uses complex algorithms like MFCC, Dynamic Time Wrapping etc. which 
require lot of overhead and nearly impossible to make it process on the smartphone. Usually in 
these commercially available software the data collected while user generates the sound is sent 
via internet to the server and processed over there and sent back to the user. Which rises another 
security issue with transfer of data over the internet. So, we primarily focused on making the 
algorithm independent and be able to function on smartphone.    
 Our proposed protocol potentially overcomes the passive and active attacks by the 
intruder. Passive attacks are when the adversary places his mobile device in the vicinity of the 
ongoing communication initiated by the user and tries to eavesdrop on the sound generated by 
the vocal cords to decipher the key. Active attacks are when the attacker observes when the 
experiment is being conducted and tries to replicate the same sound which the user initiated for 
setting up the key in order to recreate the key. With this generated key the attacker tries to 
impersonate as original mobile device. 
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 We propose our novel technique of generating a cryptographic key from user generated 
voice and used bloom filter mechanism to transfer the data between the original communicating 
mobile devices. Our proposed algorithm will have almost a zero false positive rate (0.1%) 
because, while calculating the size of bloom filter and number of hash functions we can specify 
the acceptable false positive rate which is set to 0.1%.  
There is a very slim chance (less than 0.5%) that the situation of considering the original 
mobile as an intruder and denying the access may happen. This happens when the maximum 
frequency component and time at which the maximum occurred in the sound pressure signal 
does not fall in the error range. In this case we need to perform the experiment once again and 
generate the key.  
7.2 Future Work 
In future we are going to generalize the above experiments to consider all types of smart 
phones instead of restricting to one single model. We are also interested in developing a 
dedicated app, which records the voice and process the data by using our protocol and gives 
output of the shared secret key between the two mobile devices after querying the bloom filter 
received. We also want to make this application share the data between multiple devices (more 
than two devices) at the same time. 
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APPENDIX A 
 
BLUETOOTH LOW ENERGY (BLE) SNIFFER, EAVESDROPPING THE DATA 
A.1 Abstract 
Fitbit is a fitness tracker, it records all the physical activities and then using Bluetooth low 
energy (BLE) it sends the data to smartphone. BLE Sniffer can sniff packages and by using 
Wireshark they could be analyzed. So the question is, could these packages be decrypted and 
altered?, The following demo will show how sniffing of packages can be done. 
A.2 BLE Sniffer 
BLE Sniffer (nRF51822 – v1.0) from adafruit was used in this demo. This sniffer works only 
with BLE and only with Bluetooth version 4.0. That’s a great fit to use it with Fitbit. 
 
 
Figure A1  BLE sniffer (nRF51822 – v1.0)  
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A.3 Software 
  nRF-Sniffer from adafruit is recommended to use with BLE Sniffer. This software scans all 
the possible devices that could be sniffed. After the device is choses, then Wireshark will be used 
to analyze and navigate the packages.  
A.4 nRF- Sniffer  
 First step is to plug in the sniffer to PC and start nRF-Sniffer. Similar screen as below will 
be displayed. 
 
Figure A2  Display of nRF sniffer 
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There are 3 devices, if the sniffer is not able to recognize and tell which one is Fitbit, then 
it is necessary to run Wireshark on each device and analyze packages. In order to start Wireshark 
enter the device number and press W.  
 
Figure A3  Connecting to the device 
A.5 Wireshark 
 Wireshark is used to sort packages, navigate through them and most importantly it is easy 
to ignore empty packages. If the Fitbit is not connected to anything and awaits pairing then it will 
send ADV_IND packages that do not contain any data regards to the activity of the user. 
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Figure A4  Wireshark readings of packet transfer 
After connection with smartphone has been established, the packets will start to contain 
the actual data. The data packages are encrypted. 
 
 
 
